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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD WILLIAM BURGESS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 93-378-CA 
Category No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in the state's responsive brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief 
or attached as an addendum to this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
REPLY TO STATE'S POINT I B 
THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT FROM WHICH 
DEFENDANT APPEALS IS A FINAL ORDER AND IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
The state argues in its brief that since defendant 
is still at the Training School the Order entered by the 
trial court is not appealable, that the dispute is unsettled 
and therefore the Order is not a final Order. 
Rule 3 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, states "an appeal may be taken from a district, 
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juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law..." The 
court in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Layton , 600 P. 2d 
538 (1979) stated: 
As a general rule an appeal may be taken 
to this court only from a final Order or 
judgment. (Cites omitted) A judgment is 
final when it ends the controversy between 
the parties litigate. 
The order being appealed from is a final order. 
The issue before the trial court was whether to apply the 
current law or the law in effect when the defendant was 
sentenced in making any decision regarding placement of the 
defendant in a facility other than the State Training 
School. The court determined that the current law should be 
applied. The controversy between the parties ended with the 
order of the court. There are currently no other issues 
which are undecided. 
The state further argues that since no placement 
recommendation has been made the dispute is unsettled. If 
the order had not been appealed from, then if a placement 
recommendation were made in the future, the only issue that 
defendant could contest would be whether the agents of the 
state correctly applied the current law. Defendant would 
not be able to contest the order being appealed from since 
more than thirty days would have elasped from the date the 
order was filed. 
The cases cited by the state do not apply to this 
case since the defendant is not asking this court to render 
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an advisory opinion, the claim is ripe, the order is final 
and resolves the claims of the parties. This court should 
hear defendant's appeal. 
II 
REPLY TO STATE'S POINT I C 
THE 1992 STATUTES WERE PASSED AFTER 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED AND 
SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT 
OR APPLIED TO HIM. 
The state argues that the 1992 statutes should be 
given retroactive effect because they affect only procedural 
rights and that defendant only had an expectancy that the 
former statutes would continue to apply to his case. 
The court in State v. Norton , 675 P. 2d 577 
(Utah 1983) discussed the issue of when an expectancy 
becomes a perfected defense. In that case, the defendant 
was convicted of homicide and appealed his conviction. At 
the time defendant appealed, the law provided that the 
defendant could only be sentenced to a mandatory life 
sentence if reversible error was found in the sentencing 
procedure. During the appeal, the legislature repealed the 
statute. On resentencing, the defendant argued that the law 
in effect at the time the crime occurred should govern. The 
court determined that the amended statute should apply and 
stated: 
While his appeal was pending and prior 
to the amendment, defendant "expected" 
that if prejudicial error occurred in his 
sentencing proceeding he would automatically 
receive life imprisonment. If he had 
already been resentenced to life imprisonment, 
the amendment obviously could not be 
applied to his case. But since defendant 
is to be resentenced after the effective 
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date of the amendment, the defense or "right" 
under the old statute never accrued. 
Consequently, defendant can be resentenced 
under the amended statute without violating 
the ex post facto provision in Utah 
Constitution Article 1 Section 18. 
The court in Washington National Insurance 
Company v. Sherwood Associates , 795 P. 2d 665 (Utah App. 
1990) stated: 
The narrow "procedural" exception to the 
rule against retroactive application of 
statutes is best understood by reviewing 
the few cases where the Utah Supreme Court 
has found the statutory change procedural 
and thus held that it could be applied 
retroactively:...Statutes have been held 
to be procedural or remedial and thus 
outside the provision of retroactive 
application of Section 68-3-3 where the 
change only affects the judicial machinery 
for enforcing substantial rights or where 
the change simply clarified the legislature's 
previous intent. 
In order for the exception to apply, the case must 
be pending. Norton , supra. A case is pending until its 
final determination on appeal. Since this case was not 
appealed following sentencing, this case is no longer 
pending. The exception to the general rule that statutes are 
not to be applied retroactively is a narrow one and is to be 
applied with caution. 
The state cites Smith v. Cook , 803 P. 2d 788 
(Utah 1990) for the proposition that statutes are deemed 
procedural where the change does not enlarge, eliminate or 
destroy vested rights. In Smith , one of the issues before 
the court was whether a law passed after the defendant was 
placed on probation which shortened the time a felon could 
be placed on probation should be applied to him. The court 
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held that the amendment limiting the time a person could be 
placed on probation enlarged the rights of an individual and 
therefore was substantive and the amendment would not be 
applied. The court stated: 
The rule set out in the cases cited by 
plaintiff is applicable only to situations 
in which the amendment that lessens the 
criminal penalty becomes effective prior 
to the time a criminal defendant is 
sentenced. We have consistently held that 
in such situations, "the law in force at 
the time of sentencing governs and...that 
an amendment to a statute passed after 
sentence has no affect on the matter... 
when a person has been sentenced under 
a statute, that person has incurred a 
penalty under the statute; therefore, 
pursuant to Section 68-3-5, an amendment 
to the statute that becomes effective after 
a sentence has been imposed has no effect 
on that sentence. 
The reasoning of the Smith case applies to the 
instant case. After a sentence has been imposed, the 
statutes in effect at the time of sentencing control and 
amendments to the statute have no effect. 
In the instant case, defendant was sentenced on 
August 30, 1990. The 1992 statutes became effective July 1, 
1992. Clearly the 1992 statutes cannot be applied to 
defendant. 
Ill 
THE APPLICATION OF THE 1992 LAWS TO DEFENDANT 
VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO PROVISION OF ARTICLE 
1 SECTION 18 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
While defendant did not initially raise the issue 
of whether the state's attempt to apply the 1992 statute to 
the defendant violated the ex post facto provision of the 
Utah Constitution, defendant should be allowed to respond 
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since the state has raised that issue in its brief. 
Appellant's brief page 14, Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure indicates that reply briefs are limited 
to any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The 
state has raised the issue of ex post facto laws by relying 
on cases which determined whether a statute violated the ex 
post facto provision in the Utah Constitution. Norton , 
supra. Belt v. Turner , 483 P. 2d 425 (Utah 1971). 
Furthermore, the court in its discretion, may decide a case 
upon any points that its proper disposition may require, 
even if first raised in a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions 
First National Bank, N.A. , 611 P. 2d 392 (Utah 1980). And 
since the state has relied on cases dealing with ex post 
facto issues, it will not be prejudiced by the court's 
consideration of an ex post facto argument. In Re Marriage 
of Stern , 789 P. 2d 807 (Wash. App. 1990). 
Article 1 Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah 
states: 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, 
or law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed. 
An ex post facto law is one that "punishes as a 
crime an act previously committed which was innocent when 
done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged 
with crime of any defense available according to law at the 
time when the act was committed." Norton , supra. The 
application of the 1992 laws to defendant would make more 
burdensome the punishment for his crime by increasing the 
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probability that defendant would be committed to the Utah 
State Prison and would violate the ex post facto provision 
of the Utah Constitution. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah recently 
held in Andrews v. Board of Pardons , 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1992) that a law which would diminish the opportunity for a 
commutation hearing would violate the ex post facto clause 
of the Utah Constitution. In that case, the court 
determined that the Board should reconsider Andrews petition 
for a commutation hearing based on the law as it existed in 
1974, when he was sentenced. If a diminished opportunity to 
have a commutation hearing violates the ex post facto 
provision of the Utah Constitution then an increased 
probability of being sent to the Utah State Prison would as 
well. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the court should 
overrule the order of the trial court and hold that the 
statutes in effect when defendant was sentenced should be 
applied to any placement decision made during defendant's 
incarceration. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
JOEL D. BERRETT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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